CPS Security

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CPS Security
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* X. Yin and S. Lafortune, "[http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WODES.2016.7497873 On Two-Way Observer and Its Application to the Verification of Infinite-Step and K-Step Opacity]", Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Discrete Event Systems, June 2016.
 
* X. Yin and S. Lafortune, "[http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WODES.2016.7497873 On Two-Way Observer and Its Application to the Verification of Infinite-Step and K-Step Opacity]", Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Discrete Event Systems, June 2016.
  
* L.K. Carvalho, Y.-C. Wu, R.H. Kwong, and S. Lafortune, "Detection and Prevention of Actuator Enablement Attacks in Supervisory Control Systems",  Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Discrete Event Systems, June 2016.
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* L.K. Carvalho, Y.-C. Wu, R.H. Kwong, and S. Lafortune, "[http://dx/doi.org/10.1109/WODES.2016.7497863 Detection and Prevention of Actuator Enablement Attacks in Supervisory Control Systems]",  Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Discrete Event Systems, June 2016.
  
 
* Y.-C. Wu and S. Lafortune, "[http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2015.7402762 Synthesis of Opacity-Enforcing Insertion Functions That Can Be Publicly Known]", Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp.  3506 - 3513, December 2015.
 
* Y.-C. Wu and S. Lafortune, "[http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2015.7402762 Synthesis of Opacity-Enforcing Insertion Functions That Can Be Publicly Known]", Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp.  3506 - 3513, December 2015.

Revision as of 20:44, June 27, 2016

This is the wiki for the NSF SaTC project TWC: Small: Intrusion Detection and Resilience Against Attacks in Cyber and Cyber-Physical Control Systems

NSF award number: CNS-1421122.

PI: Stéphane Lafortune


Abstract

This project investigates of a novel methodology for analyzing and designing secure cyber and cyber-physical systems that contain feedback control loops and that interact with their environment through a set of potentially vulnerable sensors and actuators. The actuators and sensors can be compromised by a malicious attacker intent on altering the system behavior by corrupting sensor values or actuator commands, thereby enabling or forcing the execution of unsafe behavior. Using a formal model-based approach, the following problems are being investigated: (i) Detection of intrusions that result in compromised system components (sensors or actuators); (ii) Design of remedial control strategies that combat malicious attackers upon detection of intrusion; and (iii) Design of control strategies that are resilient to potential intrusions and prevent damage from being inflicted upon the system. The technical approach being pursued has its foundations in the theories of diagnosability, opacity, and supervisory control of discrete-state event-driven dynamic systems. The research plan to the problems of intrusion detection and resilience against attacks contains a creative blend of these theories with game-theoretic approaches to reactive synthesis problems, in order to capture the dynamic game between the control system (acting as the defender) and the attacker. The goal of the defender is to optimize its trade-off between functionality and vulnerability. Given the prevalence of feedback control loops in cyber and cyber-physical systems, the methodology being developed will impact a large class of technological systems that are of great societal importance.

Publications

Journal Papers

Conference Papers


Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

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